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i n f o

a b s t r a c t
In this review, we develop a framework to guide future research and to examine the execution
of leadership in extreme contexts. We start by deﬁning and distinguishing extreme contexts
from crisis and other contexts. A ﬁve component typology is developed comprised of
magnitude of consequences, form of threat, probability of consequences, location in time and
physical or psychological–social proximity. We discuss the unique inﬂuences these
components have on leadership processes in extreme contexts examining the relevance of
organization types such as critical action and high reliability organizations. Further, we present
a set of factors that may attenuate or intensify the dimensions comprising an extreme context,
thus inﬂuencing either a team or organization's ability for adaptive leadership response.
Ultimately this framework seeks to develop a richer understanding of extreme contexts to
advance the future development of contextualized theories of leadership for extreme contexts.
Published by Elsevier Inc.

Stories about leaders often detail how they successfully led their organizations to overcome great challenges or peril. The
frequency of these extreme stories would suggest that the ﬁeld of leadership studies should have a lot to say about how leaders
function in extreme contexts. As we will show in this review, that is not the case and in fact leadership in extreme contexts may be
one of the least researched areas in the leadership ﬁeld. Yet, while minimal, some important research has been conducted such as
Sorokin's (1943) examination of reactions of groups to catastrophic events, where he concluded that group members became so
overly aroused and emotional that they distorted the way they processed information and made decisions. The premise of this
paper is that leadership is uniquely contextualized in such extreme contexts where risks of severe physical, psychological or
material consequences (e.g., physical harm, devastation or destruction) to organizational members or their constituents exist. In
terms of the practical value of our discussing extreme contexts and leadership, while extreme events are rare in some
organizations, they are commonplace in others such as military, medical, law enforcement, ﬁre, and crisis response organizations.
Beyond being limited in number, Bass (2008) concluded that the prior research on leadership and groups operating in extreme
contexts has tended to treat such situations as homogenous. Responding to Bass' concern, we suggest that before a productive
stream of research on leadership for extreme contexts can be initiated, we believe it is critical that we ﬁrst deﬁne what ‘context’
means here, and to differentiate and decompose extreme contexts such that we can develop a richer understanding of how they
contextualize leadership. Taking a contextual focus to examining leadership is not something that is a recent insight. Over the last
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two decades scholars have made numerous calls for leadership researchers to take greater account of contextual factors in the
formulation of their theories as well as in operational deﬁnitions of leadership (e.g., Avolio, 2007; Boal & Hooijberg, 2000; Shamir &
Howell, 1999; Tosi, 1991). Yet, in a recent review of the literature, Porter and McLaughlin (2006, p. 573) note that “it is apparent
that the impact of organization context on leadership is an under-researched area.” Ultimately, substantial research in extreme
contexts will be required to advance our knowledge in this critically important area of leadership research—perhaps the area
where leadership is needed most.
We believe extreme contexts create particularly unique contingencies, constraints and causations; requiring researchers to
view such leadership as inherently contextualized. As described by Osborn, Hunt, and Jauch (2002), a contextual theory of
leadership is one that recognizes that leadership is embedded and “socially constructed in and from a context” (p. 798), and put
it well that, “leadership and its effectiveness, in large part, are dependent upon the context. Change the context and leadership
changes” (p. 797). Yet, we will also note that leadership is not just passively inﬂuenced by extreme contexts, but can interact
with the context and serve to intensify or attenuate levels of extremity. For example, Gal and Jones (1985) argue that leaders
who are strong, conﬁdent and deliberate will attenuate levels of stress among followers, while also increasing their conﬁdence
to perform in extreme contexts over time. Conversely, in their reviews of disasters, Dynes and colleagues (Dynes, 1974; Dynes,
Quarantelli, & Kreps, 1981) argue that besides the disaster itself (e.g., a hurricane), the second major source of negative
outcomes come from errors of commission or omission in the organization's and its leaders' actions in response to the disaster
and its aftermath.
We make clear that we are not developing a prescribed theory of leadership for extreme contexts. Instead, our intent is more
descriptive and seeks to set the stage for advancing future research to develop such prescriptive models by providing researchers
with a semantic and conceptual toolbox with which to explore this context itself and its unique inﬂuences on leadership. Our hope
is that this review makes clear that any theory of leadership for extreme contexts cannot be loosely generalized, but that different
forms of extreme contexts exist and different types of organizations engage in extreme contexts; with both creating patterns of
dynamics that inﬂuence leadership through unique contingencies, constraints and causation.
To guide our efforts, we assessed literature and case studies from a broad range of extreme contexts as well as doctrine from
organizations that operate in extreme contexts such as the U.S. Army and National Wildﬁre Service.4 Guided by this review, we
began to place some boundaries on what actually constitutes an extreme context—and even more importantly—what does not. We
begin by deﬁning and differentiating extreme contexts at the macro level, followed by a discussion of various organization types
that operate in extreme contexts and how these types further contextualize leadership at a meso level. From this base of
understanding, we begin a detailed exploration of the ﬁve dimensions of extreme contexts presented in Fig. 1. We then discuss
how various factors can attenuate or intensify levels of extremity and the ability to produce or inhibit an adaptive leadership
response. Throughout we seek to highlight the unique inﬂuences that various forms of extreme contexts can have on leadership
processes with the hope that this knowledge may inform more reﬁned approaches to future leadership research.
1. Deﬁning and distinguishing extreme contexts
1.1. Deﬁning extreme events and extreme contexts
We start with the assumption that extreme events can occur in any organization, regardless of whether it is operating in what
we would traditionally consider an extreme context. For example, serving in the Pentagon prior to 9:39 a.m. on 9/11 was likely not
considered to be an extreme context, but it certainly became one after the terrorist attack on this facility. We suggest that unique
factors inﬂuence leadership in important ways depending on where and when it is occurring relevant to the extreme event and
context, and across periods before, during, or after an extreme event.
In deﬁning these terms we suggest the presence or threat of one or more extreme events is a necessary, but not a sufﬁcient
condition to constitute an extreme context. We hold that the event(s) must 1) have potential for massive physical, psychological,
or material consequences that occur in physical or psycho-social proximity to organization members, 2) the consequences of
which are thought unbearable by those organization members, and 3) are such that they may exceed the organization's capacity to
prevent those extreme events from actually taking place. Therefore, we deﬁne an extreme event as a discrete episode or occurrence
that may result in an extensive and intolerable magnitude of physical, psychological, or material consequences to—or in close physical or
psycho-social proximity to—organization members. Going beyond an extreme event, we deﬁne an extreme context as an
environment where one or more extreme events are occurring or are likely to occur that may exceed the organization's capacity to
prevent and result in an extensive and intolerable magnitude of physical, psychological, or material consequences to—or in close physical
or psycho-social proximity to—organization members.
4
Examples include the Mann Gulch (Weick, 1993) and South Canyon ﬁres (Useem, Cook, & Sutton, 2005), Indian Ocean Tsunami (Athukorala & Resosudarmo,
2005; Rodriquez, Wachtendorf, Kendra, & Trainor, 2006), Bhopal Chemical release (Bowman & Kunreuther, 1988; Shrivastava, 1987; Union Carbide Report,
1985), Three Mile Island meltdown (Hopkins, 2001; Perrow, 1997), Columbia Space Shuttle explosion (Heimann, 1993; Starbuck & Miliken, 1988; Vaughan,
1996), Westray mine disaster (Hynes & Prasad, 1997), Mount Everest climbing incidents (Kayes, 2004; Tempest, Starkey, & Ennew, 2007), hurricane Katrina
(Comfort, 2007; Gheytanchi et al., 2007; Kapucu & Van Wart, 2006; Rego & Garau, 2007), Tenerife airplane collision (Weick, 1990), Chernobyl (Hohenemser,
Deicher, Ernst, Hofsäss, Lindner, & Recknagel (1986)), numerous military leadership and combat studies (e.g., Cosby et al., 2006; Morath, Ccurnow, Cronin,
Leonard, & McGonigle, 2006; Leonard, Polich, Peterson, Sorter, & Moore, 2006; Department of the Army, 1950, 2008; Scales, 2006; Snook, 2000; Ulmer, Shaler,
Bullis, DiClemente, & Jacobs, 2004; Wong, Bliese, & McGurk, 2003) and organizational doctrine such as the U. S. Army (Department of the Army, 2006) and
National Wildﬁre Service (2007) leadership manuals.
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Fig. 1. Typology of extreme contexts.

1.1.1. Differentiating extreme from crisis
It is also important to differentiate extreme contexts from the common usage of the term crisis in the literature. Crisis is both a
more general term and has also been used to explain relatively mundane contexts. For example, in their model of crisis
management, Pearson and Clair (1998) include events spanning from copyright infringement and malicious rumors to natural
disasters. Our position is that, while related, extreme contexts are unique from crisis and demand more reﬁned characterization.
The models of organizational context by Jick and Murray (1982) as well as Osborn et al. (2002) used Hermann's (1969)
deﬁnition of crisis, which states, “a situation that threatens high priority goals…which suddenly occurs with little or no response
time available.” Pearson and Clair (1998, p. 60) echo these points and add that the event must be “of low probability” and
“characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution.” First, these deﬁnitions address crisis as if they are episodes,
which is akin to how we have framed extreme events (versus an extreme context). Paralleling our earlier logic, we could envision a
“crisis context” in which crisis episodes (i.e., crises) are likely to occur. Yet, due to other qualiﬁers listed below, extreme events
may come in the form of a crisis, but are not necessarily in that form.
First, whereas crisis involves the threat to a high priority goal, our deﬁnition of extreme contexts is predicated on a stricter
qualiﬁcation. In our deﬁnition, such threats must reach the threshold of “intolerable magnitude” where goals (e.g., life or safety)
are not just of high priority but are imperative, and at that point unique properties bear on leadership that are not present at lower
levels of threat. For example, the relationship between trust-in-leader and follower performance may be fairly linear until the
point where a follower may die based on a leader's decisions. This interdependency may create a threshold effect (Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2007; Sørensen, 2002) where the trust → performance linkage becomes unstable and nonlinear. We also propose that
when death or other extreme consequences are probable, leaders and followers may alter the meaning of a construct, which would
necessitate measuring it differently (Golembiewski & Billingsley, 1980; Thompson & Hunt, 1996). For example, followers faced
with losing their jobs due to a merger (often called a “crisis” in the literature) will likely conceptualize levels of “trust” quite
differently from those following a leader down a burning high rise building hallway, which is considered the most dangerous point
in an urban ﬁre. Thus, how we conceptualize the differences in trust may impact the way it's measured.
Second, whereas crisis deﬁnitions include little or no response time, we do not see this component as integral to the deﬁnition of
extreme contexts.5 Crises as deﬁned result in reactive responses, but organizations operating in extreme contexts can in fact have
foresight over or even control the initiation of an extreme event. This can potentially provide signiﬁcant periods of preparation, such as
the methodical months of force buildup and preparation prior to the U.S. military's planned launch of Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
Third, whereas the deﬁnition of crisis considers these situations to be of low probability, extreme events that characterize
extreme contexts are not necessarily so. For example, many ﬁrst responder organizations face extreme events repetitively both in
training and in daily operations.
Finally, extreme contexts are not necessarily characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution. For example, a
ﬁre company may know the source of the ﬁre, be able to estimate its speed and direction of spread based on factors such as climate
and available fuel, and know the optimum means of resolution. Yet, leadership systems may not be able to implement the
5
Although not required for a context to be classiﬁed as extreme, we do later incorporate issues of time in our framework as factors that can serve to intensify
an extreme context.
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resolution due to a lack of resources, organizational adaptability, training, and/or other factors. Similarly, an organization may have
an optimum solution to an extreme event, but be waiting for the “go ahead” from a leader outside the organization (e.g., a
politician).
In sum, crisis and extreme contexts are not synonymous. We do recognize that the two can be entrained such that a crisis leads
to an extreme context or vice versa. For example, Ember and Ember (1992) note that a crisis can lead to a scarcity of resources (e.g.,
water) leading to social and moral breakdowns that could promote extreme contexts, such as war, famine, or civil unrest.
1.1.2. Differentiating extreme contexts from high reliability organizations (HRO)
The HRO (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999) and accidents (Perrow, 1984) literatures have contributed extensive knowledge
about how organizations address catastrophic events. Later we classify HROs as a form of organization rather than a context; as
organizations can move in and out of extreme contexts. Further, we view the deﬁnition of extreme contexts as broader than high
reliability, which tends to be safety and crisis-prevention orientated. For example, Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) include power grid
operations as HROs. Furthermore, our focus is not only on macro organizational levels, but also on the micro and meso-level
contexts and consequences of individual organizational actors and groups being exposed to potential threats.
2. Organization types and contextualization of leadership
Leaders and followers do not just interact within an extreme context unconstrained, but usually as embedded in an
organizational context. This meso-level context is important to recognize because, as discussed by Osborn et al. (2002), “to the
extent that leadership is socially constructed within the society and within the ﬁrm, the meaning attached to ‘leadership’ may vary
considerably across time and across ﬁrms.” In the context of disasters, Turner (1976, p. 378) notes that organizations are “cultural
mechanisms developed to set collective goals and make arrangements to deploy available resources to attain those goals.”
Organizations are thus idiosyncratic entities and we propose that the intra-organizational context will interact with the extraorganizational context inﬂuencing their ability to respond to threats. Thus different organization types will have different sets of
attenuators and abilities to manage intensiﬁers. To address these issues, we focus on four types of organizational contexts and how
they produce unique impacts on leadership when confronting extremity: 1) trauma organizations, 2) critical action organizations
3) high reliability organizations and 4) naïve organizations.
2.1. Trauma organizations
In some organizations, such as hospital emergency rooms or ambulance or emergency medical teams, extreme events can
occur with great frequency (perhaps hourly or daily). There are some important unique parameters in such organizations. First,
they are largely reactive in that they serve to engage after extreme events have occurred. This requires them to be responsive and
able to surge resources on little notice and reset quickly for the next extreme event. As these organizations operate in contexts
where the probability of extreme events occurring is high, they require high levels of vigilance, situational awareness, and
preparedness.
While leaders and followers in these organizations may at times be at risk, the risk is often largely to the client being served. For
example, while the form of threat to the client may be physical, to operating room team members, the threat of losing a patient is
psychological versus physical. The magnitude of consequences may also vary, with the client facing relatively greater risk. This
creates unique dependencies and required trust, as well as inherent moral obligations, which may inﬂuence leadership among
responding units/members. To sustain effectiveness across frequent iterations of extreme events, these groups may require a
certain level of detachment (i.e., limited psychological proximity) from clients or the use of coping mechanisms. Emergency room
nurses, for example, must be able to maintain objectivity in triaging patients, as well as mentally detach at shift end and keep the
trauma of their work separate from their personal lives.
Moreover, as the frequency and iteration of extreme events is extremely high in trauma organizations, leaders and followers
will likely have extensive exposure to how individuals and the group functions under extreme conditions. Indeed over time
“extreme” can become “normal” and the group may require interventions to ensure vigilance is maintained (Pauchant & Mitroff,
1992; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). This is because the more experience one has with particular threats, the more likely the same
threat will not be perceived as threatening (Benner, 1984). Further, relating to time, while the frequency of events may be high in
trauma organizations, the duration is normally relatively low. A doctor may only spend minutes with a patient, or the EMT crew
will stabilize then drop a patient off at the hospital. Thus while they must maintain resilience, vigilance and other states across
multiple events, this suggests that less may be required within any one extreme event.
Finally, through frequent iterations of similar procedures and processes, trauma organizations have many opportunities for
organizational learning. Coupled with their unique responsibility and liability for clients, such organizations may tend to codify
standard operating procedures for many routine tasks and establish layers of administrative controls.
2.2. Critical action organizations
Critical action organizations (CAO) include organizations such as military combat units, certain clandestine services, or the
more active SWAT, ﬁre, search and rescue or disaster response teams. Organizations in this category engage in extreme events but
with less frequency relative to trauma organizations. These extreme events, however, may have higher potential magnitude of
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consequences (e.g., combat) with numerous CAO members and often hostile (e.g., enemy or criminal) and non-hostile (e.g., noncombatant civilians) at risk.
Unlike trauma organizations, leaders and followers in CAOs inherently place themselves at greater amounts of personal risk as
they perform their duties. Further, if they are in fact serving a “client” (e.g., rescuing a hostage or avalanche victim) CAOs are more
likely to share the same form of risk (e.g., physical) as the client. It is thus not surprising most CAOs require members to selfsacriﬁce if called upon, with this commitment often codiﬁed in oaths or codes formed into the organization's culture as a unique
ethos (e.g., Department of Army, 2006).
As facing extreme consequences is part of the organization's mission, CAOs may create higher tolerances for risk and loss,
making the “intolerable magnitude” aspect of our deﬁnition of extreme contexts relative. For example, military units will factor
killed and wounded-in-action estimates into mission planning as an unfortunate but necessary reality to combat (VanVactor,
2007). In this way, they differ from the other categories of organizations discussed in this section, which may be less likely to
engage if team members can be killed or injured.
As CAOs may engage in extreme events less frequently than trauma organizations, they may require more extensive collective
training and simulations. Due to expected casualties, such training requires redundancies and cross-functional training. If a
surgeon becomes incapacitated in the operating room during an intricate procedure, for example, another surgeon will need to be
located to step in versus a nurse or another member of the operating team. In a CAO, as they operate often under austere
conditions or time constraints do not allow personnel replacements, team members must be ready to step up and take the role of
other team members or assume formal leadership positions if leaders are lost (Stouffer et al., 1965). This requires a balance
between generalization and specialization–necessitating leader development to build the “bench” of leaders.
Further, as CAOs face hostile opposition in the course of their duties, such as enemy forces or criminals, they are further
distinguished from trauma organizations who inherently seek to “do no harm.” Normal police operations similarly do not actively
injure criminals unless in self defense. CAOs, conversely operate in hostile environs where death, injury or destruction may be
purposeful. Finally, select CAOs (e.g., military or select clandestine units) may at times proactively create extreme events at a time
and place of their choosing. They may select targets, timing and varying usage of force to accomplish goals. This distinguishes
select CAOs from other CAOs and more so non-CAOs that react to versus initiate extreme events.
2.3. High reliability organizations
Contrary to trauma or CAO organizations, other types of organizations are classiﬁed as High Reliability Organizations (HROs) (Weick,
1993; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). Normal police and ﬁre operations would ﬁt under this category. The
overwhelming majority of police ofﬁcers, for example, will never ﬁre their weapon in the line of duty much less use deadly force (Geller
& Scott, 1992). With respect to ﬁre, as noted by Useem et al. (2005, p. 466) in investigating the South Canyon Fire; standing orders were
to ﬁght the ﬁre with aggression, but always considering “safety ﬁrst.” This category also includes organizations that focus on containing
or preventing extreme events as a primary function, such as disease control organizations or nuclear power plant operations.
Although of lesser probability than trauma or CAO organizations, HROs may face extreme events if a situation goes outside
normal boundaries and thus would likely present unique contingencies and normative constraints on leadership processes that
are distinct from those in naïve organizations. Due to their focus toward prevention, HROs may tend to be highly administrative in
their controls and well practiced for a wide range of anticipated extreme events (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001; Weick, et al., 1999).
Therefore, such organizations tend to focus heavily on risk management policies and systems and on tracking indicators that may
signal impending systems failures (Glendon, Clarke, & McKenna, 2006).
Weick and colleagues studied organizations that perform repetitive tasks with little margin for error, such as ﬂight deck
operations on aircraft carriers and power grid operators where their research showed such organizations balance speed and
efﬁciency with safety. A differentiation can be made between aircraft ﬂight deck operations, which consistent with Weick we would
term an HRO, and the attack aircraft wing that launches from that carrier which we would term a CAO. This is because once they are
airborne and on combat mission, while safety remains important, it is subordinate to combat mission accomplishment. Here the
factors unique to CAOs (e.g., proactively creating versus avoiding extreme events) may provide contingences and constraints on
leadership that differ from HROs.
2.4. Naïve organizations
Finally, there are those organizations that are thrust into extreme contexts by chance, such as a hotel faced with a ﬁre or
terrorist attack, a passenger plane being hijacked, or a school hit by a tornado. These “normal” organizations may suffer from a lack
of training and resources to respond to such events, thus intensifying extremeness. As naïve organizations see low probability of
such events occurring; they are less likely to apply resources to prepare for such events. Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) argue that
leaders in organizations that see low probability of extreme events occurring often fail to realize the importance of preparation or
use defense mechanisms (e.g., ‘someone will rescue us’) to eschew preparing for such events (e.g., D'Aveni & MacMillan, 1990;
Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). Yet, given recent world events, we wonder if the number of naïve organizations that may be thrust into an
extreme context is growing.
While we have only brieﬂy described each organization type, and done so from a largely intuitive approach, we believe that the
discussion highlighted numerous factors researchers might consider that contextualize leadership at this meso/organizational
level. Yet, we believe there are some other organizational aspects that should be considered.
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2.4.1. The people make the place
It may be important for future research to assess attraction, selection, and attrition (ASA) processes (Schneider, 1987;
Schneider, Goldstein, & Smith, 1995) related to the above types of organizations. It is plausible, if not likely, that each of the four
organization types listed above attract and select certain “types” of people and attrite those who do not meet their models. Also, as
leadership is socially constructed (Osborn et al., 2002), differential forms of leadership may be developed through social learning
as organizations operate in varying types of extreme contexts and learn what they deem to be successful leadership for those
contexts. Such implicit leadership theories (Lord, Foti, & DeVader, 1984) may then inﬂuence future ASA cycles, thereby
perpetuating those leadership models. While such social learning is required, it may also restrict change (Weick, 1988). Thus the
effects of strong cultures on adaptability in extreme contexts warrant attention in future research.
2.4.2. Extreme organizations, extreme units, and extreme operators
It is also important to note that we have used the term “organization” quite liberally in our taxonomy and need to qualify that
usage. Speciﬁcally, categorization as a trauma organization, for example, is in fact level-dependent. It would be inaccurate to
describe an entire hospital as a trauma organization or an entire Army as a CAO. Hospitals and military units each have
administrative (e.g., janitorial or secretarial) and other sub-organizations that (unless thrust into danger as a naïve organization)
do not face threat nor do their actions have direct effects on the potential consequences on clients.
Large organizations are instead multifaceted and thus would likely have subunits that ﬁt the various categories (i.e., trauma,
CAO, or HRO), such as the delineation between the carrier ﬂight deck operations and the attack wing made earlier. It may facilitate
future research to differentiate elements within organizations based on the factors of extremeness (i.e., probability, magnitude or
proximity) between those that directly face extreme contexts (e.g., an attack ﬁghter wing), those that provide direct support to
those that do (e.g., a refueling wing) and those that provide indirect support (e.g., airﬁeld operations). Based on the discussion thus
far, there is likely unique leadership phenomenon operating within each subgroup or context, resulting in group differences that
can inform the theory and practice of leadership.
3. Overview of the model
From this general understanding of extreme contexts and extreme events and organization types, we will now discuss extreme
contexts in a more speciﬁc manner based on the model presented in Fig. 1. The focal construct of the model is the box titled “level
of extremity” which we suggest can reduce the ability for adaptive leadership response. Our literature review suggested that the
level of extremity experienced by an organization or group is largely based on ﬁve primary contextual dimensions as shown.
However, we display other factors—that while not necessary for a context to be classiﬁed as extreme—can serve to either attenuate
or intensify the level of extremity experienced. Attenuators and intensiﬁers, however, are likely to only partially inﬂuence the level
of extremity faced. For example, a large ﬁre will likely create high levels of extremity regardless of any attenuators or intensiﬁers
present. Thus we also denote, as displayed by the second set of arrows in Fig. 1, those attenuators and intensiﬁers (e.g.,
organizational resources) can also positively or negatively (respectively) inﬂuence the ability for adaptive leadership response
despite the level of extremity experienced. Importantly, as noted by the dashed lines, we suggest that leaders can potentially
inﬂuence many of the attenuating and intensifying factors. We begin by discussing each of the ﬁve dimensions and the various
ways each contextualizes leadership and creates speciﬁc contingencies and causation.
4. Dimensions of extreme contexts
4.1. Location in time/temporal ordering
The ﬁrst major component of extreme contexts is time. As levels of threat oscillate within an extreme context, we expect a
concomitant oscillation of levels of extremity. While conventional wisdom might assume that extremity will be highest during an
actual extreme event, history shows that is not necessarily so. For example, the effects of the Chernobyl nuclear power accident is
expected to last for more than 30 years due to cancer and other effects (Hohenemser et al., 1986). Similarly, Shrivastava, Mitroff,
Miller, and Miglani (1988) report that in the months of aftermath of the Bhopal accident, 2500 people were killed and 200,000
injured; 2000 animals were killed and 7000 injured; and massive amounts of crops and vegetation were destroyed.
Bruning (1964) and Leonard and Howitt (2007) suggest that what constitutes effective leadership will vary over the stages of
preparation, response and recovery from an extreme event. We further suggest that leaders may also need to effectively manage
the transitions from stable to extreme and back to relatively stable, along the way continually rebalancing the unit or organization
with respect to emotional, cognitive and physical perspectives.
4.1.1. Preparation
Leadership is critical in preparation for an extreme event to provide foresight, planning, training, and other preparedness
efforts (McConnell & Drennan, 2006; Smits & Ally, 2003). Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) and Pearson and Mitroff (1993) both
highlight the critical roles leaders play to get an organization “crisis prepared.” Unless the probability of an extreme event(s)
occurring is readily perceived, leaders must overcome human tendencies to believe that “it can't happen to us,” where leaders may
need to create “cognitive shifts” in their groups (Foldy, Goldman, & Ospina, 2008) to better realize potential threats and the
vigilance and preparedness required. From a sociological perspective, Clarke (2006) argues that “possibilistic thinking” is required
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where, even though an extreme event may be rare, the potential magnitude of consequences warrants planning and preparation.
We address these leadership demands in more detail in the section focusing on magnitude of threats.
Also, organizations that infrequently engage in extreme events, such as a police department in a low crime area, may establish
routines that result in boredom and may require leaders to intervene to maintain vigilance, motivation and performance such that
they are not caught “ﬂat footed” if an extreme event occurs (Grant et al., 2007). The dangers associated with routinization are not
restricted to organizations with limited exposure to extreme contexts. Indeed, it can stem from what actually constitutes the
nature of exposure for a particular group.
Leonard and Howitt (2007) discuss that organizations can face routine or non-routine extreme events. What is considered
routine, however, is likely idiosyncratic to individual organizations as outlined above and the frequency they ﬁnd themselves in a
particular extreme context. For example, in Somalia, Army Rangers had conducted six other successful raids to capture insurgents
prior to the ill-fated mission portrayed in Black Hawk Down (Bowden, 1999). Some argue that earlier successful missions created a
lack of vigilance; where expecting another rapid daylight mission, some soldiers left their night vision goggles and other
equipment and supplies that would later be critically needed behind at their base camp.
During preparation phases teams can leverage debrieﬁngs from prior events to prepare for subsequent incursions into future
extreme operating contexts. For example, after action reviews for interpreting failures could produce richer and more complex
mental models or expert schemas that could facilitate teams in addressing future extreme contexts (Holyoak, 1991; Marks,
Zaccaro, & Mathieu, 2000). Thus, what leaders do after an event in preparation for the next may be as important as what they do in
the extreme events in preparing for successful performance.
Finally, some ‘technological’ extreme events (e.g., Challenger Shuttle, Three Mile Island reactor, or Bhopal chemical spill) may
even be caused by organization members. Such failures can stem from breakdowns of mindfulness, sense-making or failure to
provide proper training, safeguards, or oversight (Pearson & Clair, 1998; Perrow, 1997; Turner, 1976; Weick 1988).
Beyond preparing an organization psychologically, Shrivastava et al. (1988) note that during pre-event phases leaders need to
prepare the physical and social infrastructure, establish monitoring and surveillance systems, redundant essential services,
emergency action plans, medical systems, and other capacities. Further, as poor information exchange and coordination is normally
problematic during extreme events (Turner, 1976), it is also critical to establish redundant leadership and communications systems
across internal and external networks.
4.1.2. In situ
In summarizing 500 ﬁeld studies of disasters conducted by the Disaster Research Center, Quarantelli (1988, p. 374) notes that
the principles of disaster preparation and crisis management are not “two sides of the same coin” and that “there is, in fact, only a
partial correlation between the undertaking of preparedness planning and the successful or good management of community
disasters.” This suggests that as the context transitions from pre-extreme event to in situ, the demands on leadership and what
constitutes effective leadership may qualitatively change. For example, in his reﬂections on men in battle, Gray (1959, chap. 2)
notes that combat has a certain lure and appeal for many; as they see it as offering excitement and the exotic, and the ability to
serve one's country and test their own mettle. He notes that this excitement, however, is often quickly shattered once the exposure
to the horrors of warfare is made and the grim reality of killing or being killed is faced. Leadership has been found to be critical to
subsequent performance during this transition (Belenky, Noy, & Solomon, 1985).
Unlike pre-event phases where leaders may struggle to maintain preparation and vigilance, the levels of extreme intensity in
situ may inherently motivate members facing a threat to take action. Indeed, when extremity is high and people sense an
immediate and dangerous threat, they are prone to engage more intently (Kolditz, 2007; McKean, 1994), but not necessarily more
effectively. For instance, followers are more likely to accept hasty decisions made in threatening situations that may be poorly
determined, as well as more centralized, autocratic leadership (Bass, 2008). Therefore, leaders who provide more rapid and
authoritative responses may be more likely to be followed, sometimes regardless of the accuracy of their decisions or direction
(Mulder, de Jong, Koppeaar, & Verhage, 1986). In as much as goals are well selected, Mintz (1951) reported that groups with clear
goals were better able to work thru crises. This is consistent with Wright's (1946) research showing that aircrews responded to
crises better if they perceived they had a common goal and common threat.
We suspect the relationship between the intensity of the event and the motivation of individuals addressing it is likely
curvilinear. Speciﬁcally, if the extremity is too overwhelming, and/or individuals feel a lack of efﬁcacy they will likely become more
susceptible and vulnerable, with some members becoming immobilized due to experiences of terror and other emotive responses
to fear (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Simon, 1997; Bowlby, 1969; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983;
Parks, 1971). This type of immobilization may be reversed by a leader who is dominating and aggressive, acting to quickly reduce
the ambiguity associated with events and redirecting followers to action (Fodor, 1978). Yet, even where followers are inherently
motivated and feeling efﬁcacious to perform, leaders still face the effects of increased vigilance over time which can create fatigue
and physical and mental breakdowns. In combat, for example, leaders often have to force soldiers to sleep, especially junior leaders
who feel the weight of command (Department of the Army, 1950). This suggests that shared forms of leadership may become
critical to sustaining effective performance in sustained extreme contexts, allowing different leaders to emerge while others
recover.
Under extended periods of stress, followers who trust their leader's directives are more likely to sustain focus and effort
towards achieving the mission (Sweeney, Thompson, & Blanton, 2009). As demonstrated in studies in combat (Belenky et al.,
1985; Sweeney et al., 2009), under extended and extreme stress, followers' performance will be inﬂuenced by their trust in the
leader when entering such contexts, how the leader addresses their expectations and concerns, and how they keep them focused
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on the goals for the unit (Bass, 1985). In sum, without a willingness to be vulnerable and open to the leader's directives, units can
lose focus and alignment and over time be less prepared to respond.
During the stress of extreme events, organizational systems and processes will also likely be stretched toward or beyond their
limits, and organizational roles may be challenged and break down. For example, Weick (1993) attributes the Mann Gulch ﬁre
disaster in part to ﬁre ﬁghters disobeying their leader's orders to abandon organizational procedures by dropping their tools and
starting counter ﬁres. Torrance (1961) examined military groups undergoing survival training and reported that discounting
leaders' directives resulted in cliques or in and out groups and leaders' isolation from the group; resulting in reduced perceived
power of the group, failure of the group to share relevant information, and a lack of mutual support and common goals.
For leaders operating in extreme contexts, the trust formed with their units prior to extreme events occurring is critical to how
those units subsequently perform. A lack of trust in the integrity of the leader's decisions, even during relatively short crises, can
result in the destruction of a unit's level of cohesion and commitment, or at the extreme, mutiny may occur (Hamby, 2002).
Indeed, if leadership is weak during non-stressful periods, “it will prove even weaker when disaster strikes” (Quarantelli, 1988,
p. 379).
At group level, social factors such as cohesion, organizational identiﬁcation, commitment and leadership may also serve to
mitigate stress and anxiety and maintain performance (Department of the Army, 1950, 2006). Group identiﬁcation, for example,
has been shown to buffer one's fear of death (Strachan et al., 2007). This suggests that such social “resources” would likely need to
be built prior to an extreme event. Speciﬁcally, Zaccaro, Rittman, and Marks (2001, p. 471) suggest that, “team members are likely to
display less emotional reactions to stressors if leaders provide clear team goals, clear speciﬁcations of member roles…unambiguous
performance strategies, and foster a climate where disagreements about team strategies can be aired constructively.”
Further, Weick (1988, p. 305) argues that “the less adequate the sense-making process directed at a crisis, the more likely it is
that the crisis will get out of control.” This may be why using more transactional/path–goal leadership under such stressful
situations may be more effective in keeping events under control as it provides clear step by step directions for followers
(Schriesheim & Murphy, 1976). Supporting this claim, Kugihara, Misumi, Sato, and Shigeoka (1982) observed in simulated panic
situations that those leaders who focused more on performance planning and considerations of followers as advocated in path–
goal theory were more successful in removing followers from the dangerous situation.
Yet, complicating how leadership manifests in crisis, Weick proposed that sense-making becomes problematic in extreme
events. This is because “understanding is facilitated by action, but action affects events and can make things worse” (p. 306). Weick
(1996; 1988) argues that we think by acting and that we must not only believe what we know but at the same time be willing to
challenge what we know as we act and learn from those actions. Indeed a fundamental principle of social psychology is thinking
stems from doing (Fiske, 1991); however, a corollary of this principle is that doing causes thinking (Weick, 1988; 1996). Thus,
cognition and behavior are reciprocal: both are necessary for an extensive repertoire of possible adaptive responses.
As extreme events are often at least somewhat novel, the role leaders take in “sense-giving” to assist followers in sensemaking may be critical (Foldy et al., 2008). Leaders can provide organization members a sense of meaning to “get their bearings
and then create fuller, more accurate views of what is happening and what their options are” (Weick, 1988, p. 310). The sensemaking process also underscores the importance of how leaders and followers debrief extreme events as noted earlier.
Through experiences and meaning-making, organization members form a set of if-then structures, or a ‘causal map’ that sets
their source of expectations for future action (Weick & Bougon, 1986). These rich schemata can facilitate processing future
extreme events more quickly and effortlessly and be relied upon until an event presents stimuli that are considered nonroutine that must be interpreted using a more controlled processing framework (Fiske, 1991). Thus as more responses to
potential extreme events are practiced, greater complexity will be formed in relevant schemas for individuals (Hannah,
Woolfolk, & Lord, 2009; Mumford, Friedrich, Caughron, & Byrne, 2007; Mumford, Zaccaro, Harding, Jacobs, & Fleishman, 2000)
and ultimately group mental models (Hannah, Eggers, & Jennings, 2008), promoting naturalistic decision making (Drillings &
Serfaty, 1997).
Weick (1988) draws from Shrivastava's (1987) concept of triggering events in extreme contexts, which are discernable events
that can be linked back to speciﬁc acts of human judgment and that can deteriorate under pressure (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton,
1981). We suggest that these are the critical intervention points for leadership where leader judgment and action (or inaction) can
determine the potential inﬂuence of an extreme event on performance. We believe the identiﬁcation and study of these trigger
points is critical and that future research should determine how leaders identify and establish constraints, structures and
opportunities that inﬂuence sense-making and performance at such critical points.
The transition from pre-extreme event to in situ may also have implications for the use of various forms of leader power. In
both a laboratory study (Mulder & Stemerding, 1963) and ﬁeld study aboard an aircraft carrier (Mulder, Ritsema van Eck, & de
Jong, 1971), Mulder and colleagues showed that during extreme events leaders who exercise more power, are directive and
decisive in their style, and are goal directed were more effective. These ﬁndings support the work cited above, and suggest that
followers may have pre-established schemas whereby when an extreme event triggers those schemas their response is to accept
more centralization of power and direction from their leaders (Bass, 2008; Downton, 1973). Yet, in the Mann Gulch disaster
mentioned above, we see the potential for breakdown of command and control systems. Further, in analysis of the Mount Everest
mountain climbing disaster, Kayes (2004) suggested authoritative leadership led to the team’s inability to challenge assumptions,
adapt and learn.
As we discuss later, we suspect that when extreme events are counter normative or fall within areas where well-practiced
routines do not apply, the style of leadership that will be more successful will likely be more complicated than simply being
autocratic or directive. Additionally, we have relatively little evidence on how the leadership dynamics present prior to entry into
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extreme contexts inﬂuences leadership dynamics during extreme events (i.e., are entrained), or afterwards for that matter. For
example, based on the principles of idiosyncrasy credits (Hollander, 1964), leadership prior to an extreme event may build
“credits,” or as we suggested above, higher levels of trust, that can be “expended” during extreme events as formal and informal
leaders exercise inﬂuence.
In line with the literature cited above, Dynes (1983) and Perrow (1984) reported that leadership during actual extreme events
normally becomes more directive and transactional. While we noted conﬂicting ﬁndings of whether directive leadership is most
effective in those contexts, we suggest the answer to that question may be more contingent. It is entirely plausible that the actions
leaders take before an extreme event to build idiosyncrasy credits, allows them to be more directive during an extreme event
based on the trust and conﬁdence they have built prior. If insufﬁcient, as the level of dependency followers have on their leaders
for outcomes (e.g., death or injury) rises, they may challenge or discount those leaders (Hurst, 1995; Sweeney et al., 2009), such as
occurred at Mann Gulch (Weick, 1993).
Finally, the Greek philosopher Heraclitus stated that “no man ever steps in the same river twice, for it's not the same river and
he's not the same man.” Similarly we propose that an important temporal phenomenon for future study is related to how people
and organizations change or develop as they move into and out of extreme events. This can be either good (e.g., new knowledge
and competencies, built conﬁdence, or post-traumatic growth) or bad (e.g., post-traumatic stress) depending upon the nature of
those experiences, sense-making processes used, and the leadership operating before, during, and after the event. Of particular
interest is how experiencing extreme events impact future thoughts and behaviors at individual and collective levels differently
than less extreme events, and how leadership may inﬂuence the ways these crucible experiences are interpreted effectively in
order to accelerate development to address the next set of events.
4.1.3. Post event
Transitioning to the period after an extreme event, certain styles and orientations towards leadership may be required that
helps the organization's social system to reconstitute (e.g., heal, learn, and bounce back) as well as restore systems, procedures and
resources (Porﬁriev, 1996). Concerning social aspects, Seifert (2007) suggests that to promote trust and relieve anxiety after crises,
leaders need to be open and transparent and publicize ongoing efforts taken to restore processes and systems, reconstitute
personnel and other resources; as well as identify the various forms of support available to members. Without such transparency,
maladaptive myths and rumors can easily spread in extreme contexts (Gephart, 1984). This is a critical time, as after crises there is
a tendency for followers to feel more vulnerable and are more willing to scrutinize their leaders (Hurst, 1995); as well as the
organizational processes, culture and assumptions that guided actions (Bartunek, 1988).
Pearson and Clair (1998) indicated that organizations require what they called “psychic reorganization” after extreme events
to restore individuals' assumptions about themselves and their organization and the world. Trauma from extreme events, for
example, will have threatened individuals' sense of safety (Taylor, 1983), and can leave them with maladies such as battle fatigue
or shell-shock (Belenky, Noy, & Solomon, 1985). Repeated exposure to extreme events that cannot be controlled may over time
create learned helplessness, leading to withdrawal and atrophy (McKean, 1994; Seligman, 1975). To rebuild a sense of personal
safety, Janoff-Bulman and Frieze (1983) and Foldy et al. (2008) suggest ways leaders use sense-giving to persuade followers that
they are not powerless to address future extreme contexts and events.
Staw (1980) further argues that organization members tend to seek justiﬁcation when experiencing trauma, hoping to
rationalize and justify the event and their reactions to it. Thus groups that conduct collective meaning-making to reﬂect upon
traumatic events help members to better deal with negative psychological effects (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). Moxley and Pulley
(2004) suggest that people need the opportunity to reﬂect in a supportive environment if they are to learn from hardships,
requiring leadership that is empathetic and individually considerate and that offers sufﬁcient levels of psychological safety to
process events. Without such leadership, it is likely that organizations will fail to capture lessons learned or regress to old ways.
4.2. Magnitude and probability of consequences
The next two dimensions of extreme contexts are the potential magnitude of consequences from the threat and the probability
of the consequence occurring. Leonard and Howitt (2007) and Laporte (2007) note that crises, disasters and similar events can vary
in their extremity. Extremity is often deﬁned in the literature based on scope or scale of damage or effects. For example, the Mann
Gulch ﬁre (Weick, 1993) and the 1996 Mount Everest climbing incidents (Kayes, 2004)—both which affected isolated and relatively
small groups—have been considered as more limited; while events such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami (Athukorala & Resosudarmo,
2005) or hurricane Katrina (Comfort, 2007) have been considered as more extreme or broader in terms of impact and
consequences. Instead, we suggest that levels of extremity are best speciﬁed on clearly identiﬁed levels of analysis, based on the
particular theoretical model and speciﬁcation of the levels of the IVs and DVs being tested. For example, extremity may be perceived
as higher to an individual than a larger group, as when in groups members may have a greater sense of safety (Little, 1964).
At whatever level of analysis researchers specify, we believe the level of extremity is ﬁrst a function of the potential magnitude
of consequences from the threat. For example, the potential for death would be more intense than potential for minor injury; while
at the collective level the potential loss of one soldier would be less intense than for a loss of ten. A high potential magnitude of
consequences by itself, however, may be insufﬁcient to create an extreme context. Those consequences must have a sufﬁcient level
of probability of occurring for individuals to perceive the context in which they are operating in as extreme (Pearson & Clair, 1998).
As the magnitude and probability increase, we would expect organizations to overcome some of the inertia and resistance to
prepare for extreme events noted earlier (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993) and expend resources and effort to
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initiate purposive preparatory actions and be less complacent. Therefore we would expect inherent motivation and a more intense
stance with associated shifts in organizational priorities and formations of unique interdependencies even before extreme events
occur—as well as increased vigilance.
As the components of levels of extremity rise, these contextual effects can bear on organization members affect and cognition
in numerous ways. Foremost, extreme contexts can produce terror, stress, and other emotive responses to fear (Arndt et al., 1997;
Foa & Kozak, 1986; Lazarus & Alfert, 1964; Lazarus, Speisman, Mordkoff, & Davison, 1962). Fear and other forms of stress in turn
can evoke deep self-reﬂection (Setterlund & Niedenthal, 1993); which depending on factors such as levels of self-efﬁcacy
(Bandura, 1997) or resiliency (Masten & Reed, 2002), can be either facilitative or debilitating, potentially creating rumination and
inaction when action is needed. Such psychological breakdown or withdrawal can occur if organization members' understanding
of the world are overturned, leading to withdrawal, paralysis or perhaps an active seeking for meaning (Bowlby, 1969; JanoffBulman & Frieze, 1983; Parks, 1971).
Sensory inputs from more extreme contexts are also likely highly vivid and salient (Fiske, 1991; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). This can
inﬂuence at least two major processes. First, we know that ease of recall can inﬂuence estimations of the probability of a future
event based on the ease with which it can be imagined (i.e., the availability heuristic, Tversky & Kahneman, 1982), thus raising
estimations of the probability an extreme event can occur. For leaders, this may motivate their use of controls and constraints as
preparatory measures (Dynes, 1983; Perrow, 1984). Secondly, research on dual processing models shows that information of
higher salience promotes more deliberate processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). This can be countered, however, by the ﬁnding
that in general judgment deteriorates under stress (Staw et al., 1981).
As the outcomes of leadership in extreme contexts can impact adverse consequences (e.g., death or destruction) there are
inherent moral implications. Jones' (1991) framework of moral intensity may thus be applicable. Jones describes how moral
dilemmas that have a greater potential magnitude of consequences, and higher probability of occurring, amongst other factors, are
considered more morally intense, subsequently inﬂuencing patterns of cognition and increasing attention toward moral issues;
thereby inﬂuencing leadership processes in unique ways (Butterﬁeld, Treviño, & Weaver, 2000; Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Hunt &
Vitell, 1986).
As magnitude and probability increase there is a concomitant need for capable leaders. Thus we may also expect followers to
reassess the adequacy of their leaders. For example, Sweeney (in press) found that soldiers cognitively reappraised their trust in
their leaders prior to going into combat and tended to weight their appraisal on aspects of leaders' task competence more so than
the character of the leader. This suggests that if we look at leadership as an inﬂuence process, the factors that followers' focus on in
granting inﬂuence may change.
4.3. Proximity
We propose that proximity serves as the fourth component comprising levels of extremity. Proximity can be conceptualized in
several ways including physical, psychological and/or social. There are three important aspects of proximity that need to be
considered in terms of deﬁning extreme contexts, 1) the physical proximity of the speciﬁc set of organizational members under
investigation to an extreme event; as deﬁned earlier in terms of the increased magnitude of undesirable effects and probability of
those effects occurring to those individuals, 2) the psychological or social proximity of members to the extreme event in the sense
that those members afﬁliated with leaders and followers are potentially in harm's way, and 3) the location of leaders and followers
in relation to each other in an extreme context; in that they can be operating together, or at a distance to each other. We suggest
that physical, social and psychological proximity can independently, or through some interaction, impact how leaders and
followers prepare for and perform in extreme contexts.
4.3.1. Physical distance
We think that some of the base work that has examined leadership at a ‘distance’ is relevant to the study of extreme contexts.
This work has suggested that the impact of leadership styles and behaviors on followers may vary to the degree that leaders and
followers are physically separated from one another. Antonakis and Atwater (2002) suggested that physical distance will
determine the dynamics of the inﬂuencing process such as how leaders' behaviors are perceived and interpreted by followers. For
example, in combat, leaders who share risks and hardships with soldiers are seen as more effective, trustworthy, and “in touch”
(Little, 1964).
Some authors argue that distance may diminish the level of quality associated with interactions that occur between leaders and
followers (Bass, 1998; Howell & Hall-Merenda, 1999; Yagil, 1998), and may actually result in neutralizing the leader's impact in
terms of being able to attend to followers' needs, provide timely recognition, and give appropriate direction. It is possible, as noted
above, that the mere appearance that the leader has less timely information and is less aware of followers' needs and fears could
potentially negatively impact their credibility and interactions with followers. Indeed, Klauss and Bass (1982) concluded that
physical distance in general increased the need for communication in order to maintain sufﬁciently high levels of coordination.
However, due to the entrainment of leadership noted earlier, physical distance may not necessarily translate into less effective
leadership processes. Speciﬁcally, the nature of relationships built prior to an extreme event, such as cohesion and trust, may be
more important psychological and social factors than physical distance in promoting effective leadership.
Although research examining the moderating effects of physical distance is at this point very preliminary, we do suspect that as
leaders and followers become more distributed from each other (e.g., special forces teams operating in dispersed and remote
locations), physical proximity is likely an important factor in determining the nature of leadership relationships. For example,
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Shamir (1995) reported that physically closer leaders were seen as more considerate and open to feedback, than those who were
distant from followers. Yagil (1998) noted that leaders who are physically closer to their followers may be better equipped
to deliver individually tailored conﬁdence-building communications to followers, as well as to function as role models as
compared to more distant leaders. Howell, Neufeld, and Avolio (2005) reported that transformational leaders had a more positive
impact on follower performance in physically close versus distant positions. Perhaps being physically close facilitates
transformational leaders' ability to model their support for the mission and values of the units and organizations they lead.
Based on the discussion above, how leaders and followers will perform in extreme contexts may depend in part on how the
physical proximity of leaders and followers interacts with the level of perceived stress in the context and the nature of the risk
experienced. It will be important for future research to explore differences in effects based on conditions such as: 1) where the
leader only is at risk (e.g., the leader is a bomb expert or hostage negotiator and moves his team to safety but goes in himself to
diffuse a bomb/situation), 2) where followers only are at risk (e.g., the general in the command post directing attacking units), 3)
where both leader and followers are at risk (e.g., a SWAT leader enters a house with his squad), and 4) where only civilians/clients/
patients are at risk (e.g., an emergency room doctor who is not personally at risk but the patient is; or a disaster relief worker that
responds to a disaster after the major risk has subsided). These aspects of exposure to risk may contextualize leadership dynamics
in unique ways, which in total have not yet been explored in the leadership literature.
4.3.2. Psycho-social distance
Proximity may also be an important factor in conditions where organization members are not personally at risk, but those
psychologically or socially close are. For example, the U.S. Army's Warrior's Ethos states “I will never leave a fallen comrade”
(Department of Army, 2006). History is replete with examples of soldiers voluntarily risking or sacriﬁcing their lives to save
relatively few other soldiers, such as the two heroic Delta Force operators awarded the Medal of Honor in 1993 in Mogadishu for
volunteering to attempt to save a downed helicopter crew. Yet in the same battle, while Army Rangers and Delta Force operators
were in peril, a UN relief force from Pakistan and Malaysia delayed response, and some suggest that the lack of impetus was due in
part to a lack of psycho-social closeness to U.S. forces (Bowden, 1999). Psycho-social proximity may thus inﬂuence the types of
actions taken by organizations as well as various psychological effects on organization members.
We also suggest that the social distance between leaders and followers is an important factor. Early leadership scholars
suggested that leaders should maintain adequate social distance from their followers in order to be effective (Martin & Sims,
1956). It was reasoned that by maintaining such social or psychological distance the leader could remain impartial and somewhat
distant from emotional concerns of followers. Yet in combat, both Little (1964) and Stouffer et al. (1965) report that leader–
follower social distance reduces with relationships becoming increasingly more informal as contexts become more extreme. Along
these lines, Mack and Konetzni (1982, p. 3) suggested that when operating in a military command context, “the successful
commander ofﬁcer …must learn to become as one with his ward room and crew; yet at the same time, he must remain above and
apart.” This duality deserves much greater attention by researchers to determine how psychological or social proximity inﬂuences
leadership relationships in extreme environments.
We do suspect that leader–follower social closeness will translate into higher levels of cohesion and trust which are critical in
extreme contexts (e.g., Department of the Army, 1950, 2008; Sweeney et al, 2009). For example, we know that a strong sense of
social identiﬁcation with the leader and unit mission results in greater feelings of belonging to a unit, and that those feelings
become important to the individual's self concept (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). For example, in conditions where high social
identiﬁcation exists, members of units experience reduced stress and are more willing to sacriﬁce for the good of the leader, the
unit, and the mission (Belenky et al., 1985; Department of the Army, 1950). This collective identity may set the conditions for
highly coordinated action, but also reduce followers' willingness to question leaders' directions. The ultimate balancing act for
leaders in these situations may be to foster a shared leadership system where the leader both maintains authority yet can be
questioned.
We know that when followers have higher levels of personal identiﬁcation with their leaders, generally noted in the
literature as charismatic, they are more willing to engage to support the leader's mission and vision and tend to align their
self concepts more closely to what the leader represents and how the leader signals them of his or her approval or
disapproval (Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993); and are more likely to desire to please and follow the leader without question
(Conger, 1989; House, 1977). Followers may become so identiﬁed with a charismatic leader that they ‘idolize’ versus ‘idealize’
and attribute extraordinary capabilities to the leader, resulting in unquestioned obedience (Bass, 2008; Howell & Avolio,
1992).
These effects of charismatic leaders have been described as emerging more often in situations where there is a crisis or extreme
event (Weber, 1947). In such situations, followers are more prone to want to follow a leader's directive to the extent the leader is
perceived as competent, conﬁdent and focused (Yukl, 2006). Yet, unless the leader has ample competence, conﬁdence and focus,
follower obedience could result in a unit making the completely wrong choice of actions such as occurred in the 1996 Mount
Everest tragedy (Kayes, 2004). The foundational work on charismatic leadership may thus be directly relevant to how we examine
psychological and social distance in extreme contexts. Such settings may provide what Klein and House (1995) described as fuel
that sparks the “ﬁre” between charismatic leaders and followers.
4.3.3. Psychological proximity and teams
Discussion of psychological proximity in extreme contexts lends itself to further discussion of team structure and functioning.
Organizations that potentially operate in extreme contexts tend toward specialization, with teams and individuals typically
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assigned speciﬁc yet coordinated tasks and responsibilities that they must deliver on when operating under high levels of stress
(Yukl, 2006). A leadership challenge that requires research to unravel is how leaders balance the ﬂexibility that self-managed
teams or units require while ensuring controls necessary for successful coordinated action to address an extreme event. This
adaptive tension, which we take up in our discussion of adaptive leadership below, may be one of the most important areas for
future research on extreme events and contexts.
What we have learned in the limited research on self-managed teams is that the leadership of successful teams does not just
come from formal leaders. For instance, Druskat and Wheeler (2003) observed that more effective self-managed teams had
leaders who relied less on legitimate means of authority and more on their expert or referent power to direct teams. Yet, we noted
the potential failures if followers subordinate themselves to such expert or referent power blindly. Again, one possible buffer for
the negative effects that personal or social identiﬁcation can have on teams operating in extreme contexts is for leaders to instill
their expectation for the team to challenge the leader's direction when warranted (Hackman, 1986). An example is the “two
challenge rule” implemented for piloting planes in the United States to guard against co-pilots becoming so psychologically close
to a pilot that they are hesitant to challenge directives. This rule sanctions co-pilots to challenge a directive at least twice if they feel
it is misguided, at which point they can take over command of the plane in an emergency situation.
In sum, the underlying paradox in the points raised above is that in extreme contexts people expect, if not desire, someone to
be in charge, largely to establish some level of perceived control. This heightened sense of vulnerability may provide the spark for
leaders to control followers in support of their visions, leading to a potentially dangerous situation if those leaders are inept,
unethical or otherwise ineffective (Howell & Avolio, 1992). As extreme contexts often drive leaders to be directive (Dynes, 1983;
Perrow, 1984) research is needed to assess whether leadership should instead (or under what conditions) be organized as a shared
process from the outset. This is particularly warranted since leadership itself cannot be distinguished from the unique social
dynamics of the context (Heifetz, 1994; Gronn, 2002).
4.4. Form of threat
The ﬁfth primary component of extreme contexts is the form of the threat itself. In deﬁning extreme contexts at the outset of
this article, we stated that potential consequences could be classiﬁed as physical (e.g., death, injury, exhaustion), psychological
(e.g., post-traumatic stress, shell-shock), or material (e.g., hurricane or ﬁre damage to a city). Differing psychological and social
effects that inﬂuence leadership likely occur based on these differing forms of the risk itself. For example, forms of physical threats
might activate mortality salience in unit members (Arndt et al., 1997), where that response would be unlikely when instead faced
with the loss of material possessions, which may instead activate threat responses based on self-esteem. Each form of threat also
likely requires a different leadership response. For example, when faced with threats to psychological well-being, effective
leadership may be that which facilitates unit members' coping (Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983; Moxley & Pulley, 2004) or sensemaking (Foldy et al., 2008). In the face of physical danger, effective leadership may be that which spurs aggressive and purposive
action (Gray, 1959). Thus as forms of threat change, follower needs change, and thus demands on leadership. Yet, research has not
investigated these contingencies.
Further, as we will discuss under attenuators, individual and group responses to threats are inﬂuenced by a broad range of individual
and group differences. For instance, Bunker (1986) reported that those individuals who felt less stress under threatening conditions
were generally more optimistic, thought they had more control over their own fate, and had a higher tolerance for ambiguity. Bartone
(1999) reported that individual hardiness can mitigate war-related stress, as do factors such as unit cohesion at group levels (Belenky
et al., 1985). Based on the nature of the attenuator, it may be relevant to countering some forms of threat, and not others.
Finally, it is important to note that the forms of threat can also come in combination. German soldiers ﬁghting on their home
soil in WWII, for example, likely faced immediate physical threat simultaneous with psychological trauma experienced from
killing and/or seeing other unit members or enemy forces killed, while also fearful for destruction of their nation's economy and
infrastructure which threatened their and their family's future.
In extreme contexts, therefore, leaders likely face multifaceted and dynamic human reactions to varying forms of threat,
requiring a mix of what we will later deﬁne as adaptive and administrative leadership. In sum, the three forms of threat (i.e.,
physical, psychological and material) can impose a plethora of contingencies on leadership, either separately or combined, that are
simply too numerous to amply cover here.
4.4.1. Summary of the dimensions of extreme contexts
What is clear from the discussion thus far is that leadership is contextualized differently based on the ﬁve dimensions covered
in Fig. 1. As leader effectiveness is dependent upon the context (Osborn et al., 2002), this suggests that different models of
leadership may be more or less effective within each set of the various permutations of these ﬁve factors. Obviously, future
research should further delineate how these processes work and the contingencies and causation under which they operate. One
very important question is whether followers and groups have different models or implicit theories of optimum leader prototypes
(Lord, Foti & DeVader, 1984) for differing dimensions of extreme contexts; and if so, to determine the implications for leader
development, selection, and assignment. For example, we noted that different types of leadership may be called for before, during,
and after an extreme event. Another important question is how these prototypes impact the way followers respond to leaders in
extreme contexts, and in turn the impact their responses have on how leaders lead. An equally important question is whether the
power of being identiﬁed with the leader and organization can operate as a double edged sword, where followers tend not to
question the leader in critical moments where psychological stress is overwhelming perhaps due to physical threats to one's safety
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or life. Finally, how leaders create the conditions for shared or distributed leadership and the effects such leadership has on the
unit's motivation and performance are largely unexplored areas in the literature.
5. Attenuators and intensiﬁers
In Fig. 1, we indicate that adaptive leadership in extreme contexts may also be subject to factors that may either intensify or
attenuate the level of extremeness experienced by leaders and followers. This is because extreme contexts are multilayered and
generative. The level of extremeness is therefore related to the nature of the organization, as noted earlier, and the capabilities it
has to respond to extreme events. We address these issues by introducing a set of attenuators (e.g., psychological, social, and
organizational resources) that we propose will reduce the probability or magnitude of extremeness of an event and/or an
organization's ability to respond; as well as a set of intensiﬁers (e.g. aspects of time and complexity) that will raise the level of
extremeness experienced and/or reduce an organization's ability to respond.
As an example, we have deﬁned an extreme context as one that may exceed an organization's capacity to counter. If a helicopter
crashed, leaving a special forces' unit in austere terrain, the high level of training and necessary equipment available for operating
in such conditions these units possess would attenuate the extremeness of the context, as compared, for example, to a supply unit
in a similar crash. The level of extremity would be intensiﬁed, however, if that Ranger unit lost tangible organizational resources
(e.g., communications equipment) in the crash or had low psychological resources (e.g., lower efﬁcacy due to never operating in
similar terrain, or low social resources (e.g., a newly formed unit with little task or social cohesion).
We frame these attenuators and intensiﬁers as ‘real’ versus merely perceptual (e.g., the special forces' unit actually has more
applicable training and equipment). We recognize that individuals and groups will also likely vary in their perceptions and
attributions toward the same context, estimates of their level of capability, or other factors. Such variance, biases, and errors in
perceptions and attributions are well established in the social cognition literature (e.g., Moskowitz, 2005; Fiske, 1991; Nisbett &
Ross, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982) so for space limitations we will not treat the expansive literature here. Finally, while our
scope does not seek to provide a theory of extreme leadership, we do suggest managing attenuators and intensiﬁers may be critical
“levers” for leadership interventions in extreme contexts as denoted by the dashed line in Fig. 1.
5.1. Psychological resources as attenuators
Beck, Emery, and Greenberg (1985) suggest that fear is experienced when the evaluation of a threat exceeds the evaluation of
one's personal resources to face that threat. This is consistent with research on the broaden and build theory (Fredrickson, Tugade,
Waugh, & Larkin, 2003), which demonstrated that left unchecked, negative emotions such as fear narrow the scope of cognition
and attention, limiting potential thought-action repertoires (i.e., a ﬁght or ﬂight response); while positive emotions broaden such
potential repertoires, facilitating greater adaptability under stress. Fredrickson and colleagues hold that psychological resources
such as efﬁcacy and resiliency have an undoing effect, and “loosen the hold that a negative emotion has gained on that person's
mind and body by dismantling or undoing preparation for speciﬁc action” (Fredrickson, 2001, p. 222). Weick (1988, p. 311) makes
similar propositions, noting that beliefs that “I have capacity” and “capacity makes a difference” will help expand sense-making in
organizations during crisis situations. This is consistent with Jervis (1976, pp. 374–375) who states that the “predisposition to
perceive a threat varies with the person's beliefs about his ability to take effective counteraction…whether they are vigilant or
defensive depends in large part on whether they can act effectively on the undesired information.” Thus, as sense of efﬁcacy and
control increases, stress decreases, broadening thought and action in the face of crisis (George, 1986; Shepela et al., 1999; Weick,
1988).
Importantly, these effects of psychological resources do not just change perceptions of an extreme event and one's capacity
to counter it, but enhance actual performance which could serve to attenuate the threat itself. While the scope of this paper
does not provide for a full coverage of the potential psychological resources that can attenuate extremity, we highlight efﬁcacy
and resiliency as exemplars. Constructs such as hope (Snyder, Rand, & Sigmon, 2002), optimism (Seligman, 1975), courage
(Goud, 2005; Hannah, Sweeney, & Lester, 2009), hardiness (Bartone, 1999) and others are certainly also relevant for future
research.
Resilience in the face of extreme events has been identiﬁed as a critical capacity at both individual (Reich, 2006) and collective
(Manyena, 2006) levels. Masten and Reed (2002) describe resilience at the individual level as a class of phenomena characterized
by patterns of positive adaptation in the context of signiﬁcant adversity or risk. For example, Bonanno, Galea, Bucciarelli, and
Vlahov (2006) showed the importance of resilience for New York residents to recover psychologically from the 9/11 terrorist
attacks. Manyena (2006) deﬁnes collective resilience in the context of disasters as “the intrinsic capacity of a system, community
or society predisposed to a shock or stress to adapt and survive by changing its non-essential attributes and rebuilding itself.”
Resiliency would be extremely important in prolonged extreme contexts such as when an organization cycles in and out of
extreme events (e.g., an active SWAT team) requiring the ability to ‘bounce back’ and reset for the next extreme event.
Forms of efﬁcacy are also critical factors in facing extreme events. First, self-efﬁcacy is deﬁned as “beliefs in one's abilities to
mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources, and courses of action needed to meet situational demands” (Wood & Bandura, 1989,
p. 48) and is formed through training and other mastery experiences, vicarious learning, social persuasion and sources of arousal
(Bandura, 1997). Goud (2005) states that “belief and trust in one's capabilities (i.e., conﬁdence) is a primary force in countering
fears, risks, and the safety impulse” (p. 110). It is important for building teams to operate in extreme contexts to note that
individual level efﬁcacy and collective efﬁcacy are entrained such that conﬁdence in one's group enhances individual efﬁcacy to
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perform; and in turn, the interactions of efﬁcacious individuals promote emergent collective efﬁcacy that drives group
performance (Hannah, Avolio, Luthans, & Harms, 2008).
Rusbult and Van Lange (2003) note that it is not just the power of the situation or the individual/collective that is relevant to
understanding human behavior, but also the combined interactions that will help explain the most variance. For example, if
members have beliefs in their team's potency and efﬁcacy, they tend to experience greater strength in numbers (Hinsz, 2008)
and would be expected to respond more afﬁrmatively in an extreme context. Indeed, higher levels of group identiﬁcation can
even mitigate fear of death, but as noted above, decrease the chances of the leader being challenged by followers (Strachan
et al., 2007).
Finally, we note that psychological resources need to be grounded and ‘calibrated’ or otherwise can lead to unrealistic optimism
(Weinstein, 1980) or overconﬁdence (Lindsley, Brass, & Thomas, 1995), which can create hubris or myopia or excessive risktaking (Sultan, Bungener, & Andronikof, 2002) that leads to failure. This highlights the importance of training and other
preparations before extreme events, as well as introspection and learning post-event as outlined earlier; it is critical organizations
develop accurate assessments of their capabilities.
5.2. Social resources as attenuators
Extreme events often require collective and even multi-agency action. Thus theories of social network leadership (e.g.,
Balkundi & Harrison, 2006) may be important to advance in this particular context. Kapucu (2006) for example highlights the
critical role of boundary spanners in extreme events that can link networks of external resources to counter threats. As information
exchange and coordination is normally problematic during extreme events (Turner, 1976) it is also critical to establish (and test)
leadership and communications systems across internal and external networks prior to extreme events. For example, an
intelligence network may need to connect into law enforcement and disaster relief networks in a manner that allows them to then
leverage the resources and information of those other networks.
Further, psychological resources as discussed earlier can operate at collective and even organizational levels creating social
resources (Cameron, Dutton, & Quinn, 2003) such as organizational efﬁcacy (Lindsley et al., 1995) and collective leadership
efﬁcacy (Hannah, Avolio, et al., 2008). Social resources such as unit morale, cohesion, and effective leadership are associated with
less psychiatric causalities in combat as well as greater unit effectiveness (Belenky et al., 1985; Little, 1964); and supportive social
networks can help individuals make meaning of traumatic experiences (Belenky et al., 1985; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). In a study
of American Soldiers in WWII, for example, the second most frequent reason they stated they fought was for each other and unit
solidarity (the ﬁrst reason was to end the War) (Stouffer et al., 1965).
5.3. Organizational resources as attenuators
Tangible organizational resources such as technical, ﬁnancial, or human resources are of course central to facing and
attenuating extreme contexts (Quarantelli, 1988; Turner, 1976). This can be as simple as the number of sand bags available to stop
a ﬂood, water to combat a ﬁre, or much more complicated sets of resource packages. Tangible resources are also related to other
attenuators. For example, well developed social networks can increase access to resources. Further, tangible resources inﬂuence
the level of psychological resources available such as means-efﬁcacy, which is based on an individuals' belief in the quality and
utility of the tools available for task performance (Eden, 2001). “Tools” can include resources such as implements (e.g., equipment
and computers), other persons (e.g., coworkers, followers, and supervisors), or administrative systems (e.g., procedures and
processes). Importantly, means-efﬁcacy combines with self-efﬁcacy to enhance performance (Eden, 2001; Walumbwa, Avolio, &
Zhu, in press).
Finally, organizational adaptability can be an important attenuator in extreme contexts. Adaptability involves the ability to
change during periods of contextual shifts and uncertainty (Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005). Adaptability is made more difﬁcult in
rapidly evolving situations with imperfect information. In such contexts, an organization's level of adaptability is tied directly to its
ability to collect and make sense of complex information in its environment and adjust accordingly (Chakravarthy, 1982). As noted
by Dutton and Duncan (1987, p. 291), threats to adaptability can occur when an organization becomes “locked into current
patterns of responses not because they have become routine and habitual, but because the issues are perceived as non-resolvable
due to a resource shortage.” Therefore, organizational adaptability in extreme and novel contexts requires adequate resources and
effective organizational communications systems that give organizational members the ability to share information and
coordinate (Dunn, Lewandowsky, & Kirshner, 2002; Marks et al., 2000).
Seifert (2007) notes that during extreme events ﬂatter, more adaptive organizational structures will be more effective, and
reduce rigidity, centralization, and formalization. According to Pulakos, Arad, Donovan, and Plamondon (2000), adaptive
performance occurs when organizations are designed in ways that their members are allowed to solve problems creatively (e.g.,
Hatano & Inagaki, 1986; Holyoak, 1991), and enable coping with uncertain and unpredictable work situations (e.g., Ashford, 1986;
Edwards & Morrison, 1994; Goodman, 1994; Hall & Mirvis, 1995; Mumford et al., 2007; Weiss, 1984).
We believe this discussion suggests that these attenuators individually or in concert can lessen levels of extremity and increase
an organizations' ability for adaptive leadership response. Further these attenuators are malleable or can otherwise be inﬂuenced
by organizational leadership. Yet other factors may come to bear that can intensify an extreme context. We cover two here as
examples of potential intensiﬁers: time and levels of complexity. Like the attenuators, aspects of time and complexity are not
inherent in the deﬁnition of an extreme context, but can serve to intensify levels of extremity.
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5.4. Time as intensiﬁer
Time may be an important intensiﬁer in the form of time compression, duration, and frequency. Time compression means that
an impending extreme event may shortly occur where a rapid reaction is required, limiting potential responses and decision
windows. Note our earlier distinction between extreme events and extreme contexts. Extreme events will inherently have some
level of time compression, such as a pilot ﬂying a plane hit by birds who has to choose whether to return to the home airport, or to
land on any available space large enough to accommodate the plane. An extreme context, however (e.g., manning a nuclear
reactor) may not have immediate threat. When present, time compression reduces planning, coordination and decision cycles as
well as the ability to employ resources (e.g., Shrivastava, 1987; Weick, 1993).
The duration of an extreme event may inﬂuence the ability of an individual, team, or an organization to respond to, learn
from, and adapt to the event. In longer duration extreme contexts, organizations have the beneﬁt of learning from
experiences and cycling that knowledge back into ongoing operations. Prolonged extreme events, however, can add increased
load to a team or organization and result in degenerating an organization's psychological, social and material resources. For
example, in summarizing numerous combat studies, Kollett (1982) evidences that after an initial spike in psychological
casualties at the beginning of combat, followed by a sharp reduction; such causalities then begin to increase over time from
accumulated trauma. One study in WWII showed that at 200–240 days in combat, infantrymen generally tended to become
neurotic or otherwise psychologically incapacitated, suggesting individuals do not get “used to” or desensitized to such
extreme contexts.
Finally, the frequency with which extreme events occur has numerous potential impacts. Frequency will reduce novelty and
thus increase the amount of foresight and expectation leaders and followers may have with potential threats and responses,
impacting the amount of physical and psychological preparation as noted earlier. Therefore, less frequent events may be
considered more extreme relative to organizational readiness. Indeed, through frequent repetition expertise can be formed that
then enhance naturalistic decision making in future extreme events under conditions of time compression where those knowledge
structures can be called upon (Drillings & Serfaty, 1997). Conversely, as noted earlier, with high frequency there may be a certain
level of desensitization to cues and indicators as extremeness becomes perceived as the norm.
Greater frequency of extreme events increases the load on an organization and also limits the time organizations can “reset”
and reconstitute. If that time is not ample, the next event may be more extreme relative to the depleted level of organizational
readiness. As noted earlier in discussion of preparation phases, this reset time is critical to prepare the unit psychologically,
physically, and with material. Related to psychological aspects; while American infantrymen experienced some form of
breakdown at 200 days in WWII, British soldiers lasted near 400 days; which has been attributed to Britain pulling soldiers off the
front line for respite at much greater frequency (Kollett, 1982).
5.5. Level of complexity as intensiﬁer
Complexity is also an important intensiﬁer in extreme contexts. Complexity refers to environments that are highly dynamic
due to interconnected and interdependent variables collapsing together in unexpected ways (Marion, 1999; Stacey, 1995). When
complexity occurs, seemingly small events can interact to generate unpredictable outcomes (Cilliers, 1998; Marion & Uhl-Bien,
2001; Snowden & Boone, 2007; Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2009). Moreover, complexity can be generated when many factors interact
together (e.g., a war situation) or only a few (e.g., a burning house).
Complexity is inherent in Weick's (1988, p. 309) description of crises, where he states through social enactment, “Crises
can have small, volitional beginnings in human action. Small events are carried forward, cumulate with other events, and over
time systematically construct an environment that is a rare combination of unexpected simultaneous failures.” Similarly,
Pearson and Clair (1988, p. 62) state “the ﬁrst assumption is that crises present ‘wicked problems’: They are highly uncertain,
complex, and emotional events that can play multiple parties' interests against one another.” Because extreme events often
involve complexity dynamics, the study of how leaders and followers process and make sense of complexity in extreme and
ill-deﬁned contexts will be a useful area of future research (Mumford, Zaccaro, Harding, Jacobs, & Fleishman, 2000; Mumford
et al. 2007).
In extreme contexts complexity can come from many sources. One source is the multi-agency nature of many extreme events
(Gharajedaghi, 1999; Quarantelli, 1988). In his review of crisis management, Quarantelli (1988) found that communications ﬂow
is often required both intra- and inter-organizational, from organizations to the public and from the public back to the
organization, and within the various systems of the organization—creating complex information webs where both information or
misinformation ﬂows. The difﬁculties of information ﬂow are compounded when greater numbers and varieties of agencies are
involved. Further, social aspects such as a lack of inter-organizational trust can confound communications and information sharing
in such contexts (Kapucu, 2006; Kapucu & Van Wart, 2006).
Other sources of complexity can come from the interaction of people with technology, the level of uncertainty associated with
rapidly changing, unpredictable conditions, and the number of critical events that are occurring simultaneously. As described by
Quarantelli (1988), additional factors that intensify decision making in extreme contexts may come from competing priorities of
responding agents due to things such as: 1) loss of higher echelon personnel due to overwork; 2) conﬂict over who has authority;
3) clashes over organizational domains between established and emergent groups; and, 4) surfacing of organizational
jurisdictional differences. Finally, CAOs and some HROs are pitted up against enemy, criminals, or others purposively attempting to
confound the extreme context and create complexity to thwart effective response.
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In sum, we have examined two intensiﬁers that can impact the level of extremity perceived by leaders, followers, organizations
and teams. Certainly, there are other intensiﬁers yet to be explored that may also impact the level of extremity that require further
research inquiry and discussion, that will serve to build out a model of leadership in extreme contexts.
6. Adaptive leadership response
We have proposed a taxonomy of ﬁve dimensions of extreme contexts, accompanied by attenuators and intensiﬁers that we
hope helps to formulate a general understanding of the contextualization of leading and leadership in extreme contexts. As
clariﬁed up front, it is premature to develop a speciﬁc model of leadership for extreme contexts. The discussion thus far, however,
has illuminated how the factors shown in Fig. 1 all ultimately inﬂuence the ability for adaptive leadership response as shown on
the far right of the model. Thus we expect this model will provide some level of guidance for researchers to frame and test their
theories with an appreciation of the multidimensional aspects of extreme contexts and extreme events.
Based on our literature review, here we make only general observations about the nature of leadership in extreme contexts and
offer more questions than answers, with the intent to stimulate thoughts for future research. While much more speciﬁc
differentiations are needed in the future, at this early point of theory-building we focus here on a general question, recurring
throughout this paper, of the relative effectiveness of directive (or loosely related terms such transactional, administrative, or taskoriented) versus participative (or loosely related terms such as transformational, shared, or delegative) leadership. At the
collective level, this general dichotomy can also be framed as adaptive versus administrative forms of organizing (Uhl-Bien,
Marion, & McKelvey, 2007; Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2009). These categorizations ﬁnd their roots in the early Ohio State and Michigan
studies funded, aptly, largely to study military leadership.
6.1. Leadership and adaptation to extreme contexts
Research has noted that as forms of threat become overwhelming, individuals will look to leaders to centralize authority and
take action (Gladstein & Reilly, 1985; Isenberg, 1981). This effect may be particularly true when followers feel they lack adequate
resources or structure to address the threat. Flanagan et al. (1952) observed that military leaders who took prompt and decisive
action, providing initiating structure in threatening situations, were judged as being more effective than those military leaders
who delayed action. Further, ofﬁcers who used consultative power in non-crisis situations were seen as more effective by their
followers, whereas in crisis situations the same style was not correlated with effectiveness (Mulder et al., 1986). This may be a
reason underlying the ﬁndings of Sweeney and colleagues noted earlier (Sweeney, in press; Sweeney et al., 2009), as well as
Kalay's (1983) study of Israeli soldiers operating in extended combat noting that perceptions of leader task competence is critical
in extreme contexts. Yet research is needed to determine if this focus on leaders' task competence is an artifact of leaders not
establishing norms for participative leadership in advance of extreme events as noted earlier. Returning to the entrainment of
leadership, the expectation that followers have going in and that leaders reinforce may signal followers to look to the leader for
control.
Similarly, strong informal structures and procedures coupled with the formation of similar values and identiﬁcation in a unit
may buffer or attenuate individuals against the negative effects of external threats (Gal & Jones, 1985). Yet, in sustained exposure
to threat it is possible that individuals or groups will become more rigid and less apt to challenge leaders' directions, reducing their
ability to generate required responses over time (Staw et al., 1981). Under these types of extended threatening conditions, we see
followers becoming more immobile and receptive to the type of personalized charismatic leaders described earlier (Downton,
1973).
Counter to the research above, Burgess, Riddle, Hall, & Salas, (1992) concluded based on their review of the leadership and stress
literature that effective leaders dealing with threats show greater receptivity of input from followers, integrate the efforts of their
teams, and were more approachable and less intimidating. Such leaders were also more likely to explain their actions and decisions,
and to communicate extensively. Research in combat, for example, has shown that leaders become closer to their soldiers and use less
position power (e.g., reward or coercive powers) as situations get more extreme (Little, 1964). Many of the characteristics associated
with such leadership can be characterized as being active transactional leadership, transformational leadership, and leaders who are
seen by their followers as authentic (Avolio & Luthans, 2006). In dealing with extended stress, leadership that provides competence,
support, structure, priorities, role clarity, effective communication, coordination, maintains cohesion, focus, calm, a sense of humor
and adequate preparation and response has typically been evaluated as more effective in very preliminary research on these topics
(Weinberg, 1978; Ziegart, Klein, & Xiao, 2002). These forms of leadership might maintain the high levels of identiﬁcation required of
units operating in extreme situations without necessarily compromising the authority of leadership systems.
This conﬂicting literature may be the result of studies being conducted under different conditions of extreme contexts, which
reinforces why a typology is needed. If different dimensions of extreme contexts require different forms of leadership, leaders
must be able adjust their leadership between more administrative and adaptive forms. Along these lines, Bass (2008) suggests that
effective leaders dealing with stress and threats use transactional leadership to articulate goals and expectations and the pathways
that need to be followed. He further states that transformational leadership can then augment performance by displaying care for
follower welfare, inspiring through leading from the front, and by convincing followers they are part of a larger entity and mission,
thus not isolated when confronted by threats.
In sum, we suggest research is needed to disentangle the relative effectiveness or proper mix of adaptive and administrative
leadership in order to both provide sufﬁcient structure as well as enable agentic behaviors that may be required to promote
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adaptability (Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2009). Further, as we have noted that leadership is contextualized differently before, during, and
after extreme events, differing mixes of such leadership may also be required across time.
Finding the right mix, however, may be problematic. In a complex extreme context, such as a large ﬁre requiring the
coordinated efforts of multiple ﬁre companies, more administrative leadership may be required to prevent fratricide and the
effective employment of resources which creates a tendency to consolidate administrative control (Hermann, 1963). Yet, we
expect that hierarchical control systems may break down at certain levels of complexity in an extreme context, creating a threshold
beyond which adaptive forms are needed. Indeed, in discussing organizational accidents, Perrow (1984) suggests excessive
administrative control creates an overly tight “coupling,” where once a problem in a system arises; it creates a chain reaction of
events that can create or exasperate an accident as opposed to creating conditions for adaptation.
Effective organizations may thus have set the conditions for such adaptive forms to emerge through social interaction as needed. For
example, in their case analysis of the Coast Guard during hurricane Katrina, Rego and Garau (2007) state that what made them successful
was “improvisation.” This is similar to what has in the learning literature been called an ambidextrous organization that can ﬂex between
exploitation and exploration (Hannah & Lester, 2008; March, 1991). Such adaptability has been broadly deﬁned as an effective
organizational change in response to an altered situation (Pulakos et al., 2000). For example, in Vietnam the 450 man 1/7 Cavalry was
isolated at a landing zone and facing an enemy regiment of 2000 men (as portrayed in the book and movie, We Were Soldiers Once and
Young) (Moore & Galloway, 1992). On day two of the battle the unit had 79 killed and 121 wounded and all administrative systems to
resupply, reinforce, or evacuate the battalion became untenable. Facing another major enemy assault, the unit radioed ‘broken arrow’: a
code for an American unit in imminent danger of destruction. At this threshold, administrative systems at higher headquarters for control
were suspended—adaptive organizing kicked in—and all available combat aircraft in the entire combat zone were turned over to the unit
to employ as needed.
The examples provided above highlight that different forms of leadership may be required at each of the direct, organizational, and
strategic levels in extreme contexts (Yukl, 2006). Future research will be important to then investigate the inherent tensions between the
adaptability required of organizations at the direct, tactical level, and the needs for administrative control at higher levels of the
organization in which they are embedded.
From this discussion of adaptive and administrative organizing and our framing of extreme contexts, we can formulate a general
deﬁnition of leadership for extreme contexts. We build from Yukl's (2006, p. 8) deﬁnition as a base and deﬁne leadership in extreme
contexts as:
Adaptive and administrative processes of inﬂuencing others to understand and agree about what needs to be done and how to do it,
and the process of facilitating individual and collective efforts to accomplish shared objectives and purpose under conditions where
an extensive and intolerable magnitude of physical, psychological, or material consequences may exceed an organization's capacity
to counter and occur to or in close physical, social, cultural, or psychological proximity to organization members.
6.2. Methodological issues in examining leadership in extreme contexts
Pursuing research on leadership in extreme contexts will require concomitant thinking about required methods for these contexts.
This is because extreme contexts may have nonlinear effects and high levels of variance due to the volatility inherent in these contexts.
Findings established in normal or routine contexts thus may not generalize well to extreme contexts and speciﬁc methodological
approaches may be required regarding both the deﬁnition of constructs and assessing their relationships to various criteria.
A ﬁrst area of attention will be the deﬁnition of constructs since those can be psychologically redeﬁned when facing extreme contexts.
For instance, does “trusting my peers” mean the same in a mundane ofﬁce environment where the worst threat is ofﬁce politics such as
backstabbing, as compared to war or ﬁreﬁghting settings where the worst threat is the loss of one's and others' life? Does level of trust
change as the context becomes more extreme?
Golembiewski, Billingsley, and Yeager (1976) propose a relevant distinction by considering changes in construct measurements of
type alpha (meaning and measurement of construct is stable), beta (meaning is unchanged but measurement rule is recalibrated by
respondent) and gamma (meaning is conceptually altered) (Golembiewski & Billingsley, 1980; Thompson & Hunt, 1996). Changes in
dimensionality could also be important, distinguishing ipsative measures where a respondent has to rank different options, from
normative measures, where respondents weight each option independently (Saville & Willson, 1991). Indeed extreme contexts may
present unique forced choices where one value (e.g., self-preservation) must be selected over another (e.g., desire not to kill). Finally, some
constructs may be applicable only to—or most relevant to—extreme contexts. Constructs such as bravery (i.e., physical courage) or
mortality salience, for example, operate only when exposed to physical risks.
A second area of attention will concern non-linearities in extreme contexts (Baum & McKelvey, 2006; Daft & Lewin, 1990; Starbuck,
1993). In the simplest case, linear relationships turn curvilinear when extending the range of context into the extreme. For example,
typically, a leader creating higher levels of stress among followers in order to maintain vigilance may be beneﬁcial to performance up to a
certain level or point in time when stress may become very detrimental, exhibiting non-linear and detrimental effects beyond a certain
level (e.g. Nelson & Sutton, 1990).
Further, beyond the traditional approaches to theory development focused on expected outcomes (Mohr, 1982), we suggest studying
extreme contexts requires that researchers consider modeling effects where there are high levels of variability in outcomes (e.g. Cabral,
2003; Denrell, 2003; Kalnins, 2007; March, 1991). Variability effects have already been theorized and demonstrated in various
organizational studies (e.g., narcissism of leader in Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; team demographic diversity in Fleming, 2004; culture in
Sørensen, 2002, p. 70; team diversity in Taylor & Greve, 2006). Methodologically, variability has been treated extensively in statistics
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literature (e.g. Tsetlin, Gaba, & Winkler, 2004), including tools to deal with it such as quantile regressions (Greene, 2003, p. 448) or
heteroskedasticity controls (Greene, 2003, chap. 11). Possible mechanisms to theorize effects on variability include amplifying
mechanisms on spirals (George & Jones, 2000; Hackman, 1990; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988; Lindsley, Brass, & Thomas, 1995; Weick &
Quinn, 1999). Beyond variability effects, various nonlinear phenomena can also be modeled in nonlinear ways (Meyer, Gaba, & Colwell,
2005), such as discontinuities and jolts (Meyer, 1982), hyper turbulence (Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 1990) and oscillations (Gaba & Meyer,
2008).
Finally, while complexity (Anderson, 1972) has been discussed in leadership literature (e.g., Uhl-Bien et al., 2007), empirical
veriﬁcations of complex phenomena are challenging. A few examples, however, demonstrate how to detect for instance sensitivity to
initial conditions and divergence (Gresov, Haveman, & Oliva, 1993) or chaotic conditions (see Iran Hostage Crisis analysis in Thietart &
Forgues, 1997).
7. Looking ahead and conclusions
We have highlighted throughout this paper numerous areas that require research. Most of the literature on leadership in extreme
contexts is based on rare cases (e.g., Chernobyl), thus this review is perhaps skewed by this limitation. To understand leadership in this
context requires that a dedicated research program be initiated to study the various forms of contexts typiﬁed here, to include less rare
cases such as the daily “routine” ﬁre calls a ﬁre department makes.
There are at least three important practical reasons for advancing this line of research. First, there is clear and direct application
to the theory and practice of leadership in organizations with missions to respond to extreme events and their millions of
members and clients they serve and protect around the globe. It is important that we examine the leadership dynamics that result
in reliably successful performance in these contexts where ‘failure is not an option’.
Second, this domain of research applies to an increasing number of naïve organizations that are unexpectedly engaged in extreme
contexts. For example, just in the ten years after the 1999 Columbine High School massacre where 13 students and teachers were killed,
there have been 26 more school attacks leaving 84 dead and scores more injured (School shootings, n.d.). Further, the FBI reports that since
9/11 seventeen terrorist attack plots have been thwarted in the U.S. alone, with additional averted plots not reported to the public for
security reasons (CBS News, 2009). In response to heightened terrorist threat, organizations are implementing strict security procedures,
practicing evacuation drills, and issuing emergency kits to employees. Every prominent hotel around the globe has to now consider events
such as the November 2008 terrorist attack on two luxury hotels in Mumbai India that killed 160. Even grocery stores and water treatment
facilities now have to consider the potential for mass poisonings. In sum, it appears that an increasing number of organizations may
potentially operate in extreme contexts.
Third, a better understanding of leadership in extreme contexts will inform a deeper appreciation of the mechanisms and ontology of
leadership processes and impact in general. By observing how deﬁnitions and applications of constructs, as well as the relationships
between constructs, change across the span of conditions from low to high levels of extremity; we expect that we can gain a deeper
understanding of how leadership operates. Highlighting these constraints and contingencies will perhaps challenge, provide additional
evidence for, or further inform the validity of assumptions and boundaries of current models of leadership.
At this point of our thinking, we do not believe that studying leadership in extreme contexts will necessarily change our basic
understandings of the essence of leadership. Nor do we think that the constructs currently in the literature will become inapplicable. We
will likely continue to apply most extant theories to extreme contexts such as directive, transformational, or participative; or relational
theories such as leader–member exchange, or information processing models such as implicit leadership theories to this context. We do
believe, however, that the manner and effectiveness with which such models operate will be contextualized and that the unique qualities
and characteristics of extreme contexts will create contingencies that alter the relationships between constructs in these theories; and will
require advanced methodologies.
Finally, we approached this review with the assumption that there is little literature that has examined leadership in extreme contexts.
While that assumption proved valid, we uncovered signiﬁcantly more literature than expected that can be used to apply to and inform
leading and leadership in extreme contexts. While largely not leadership research per se, the accumulated work cited informs aspects of
individual, group, and organizational preparation for and responses to extreme contexts that can provide a base from which to launch this
important new stream of leadership research.
7.1. Conclusion
We have entered into a dynamic and often unstable world where leadership matters in guiding select organizations through perilous
conditions. Our principle goal in writing this review paper was to highlight as much about what we know as what we don't know in
leadership theory and research about extreme contexts, while also linking relevant literatures to help launch new streams of theory and
research in this dynamic area. We sought to explore the rich typology of extreme contexts and provide some level of explanation of how
these factors inﬂuence leadership processes. Ultimately, we hope this discussion has provided additional building blocks to guide future
theory-building and research to better understand the impact of leadership in extreme contexts. Indeed, many of the models of leadership
already developed may well account for even higher levels of variance to the extent we apply them in the ways recommended to studying
extreme contexts. We can also think of nothing more practical than learning about leadership that can facilitate individuals, teams,
organizations; and for that matter, entire communities to anticipate and respond to those extreme events that characterize extreme
contexts.
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